Ashcroft resigns

[HedCold]

think Bush finds someone worse to replace him?

[Sir O]

“The objective of securing the safety of Americans from crime and terror has been achieved.”

Yeah, okay...

[The Sleeper]

whackbagkid knew about this a few days ago

[GonzoStyle]

I think the majority of people knew ashcroft was gone and powell is probably next.

[HedCold]

rumors came out last week, but it wasn't officially announced until today

[Sir O]

Powell's been saying he's gone for months if Monkeyboy gets reelected.

I just wonder if Ashcroft is going for the next available SC slot. His age and health have me doubting it, but I can't imagine he's through forcing his morals on the rest of us.

Let the eagle soar...

[GonzoStyle]

as long as his opponent isn't dead he may have a shot, dead opponent he has no shot.

[Sir O]

Except to get to the Supreme Court you don't run against anyone...you're appointed by the president and just have to pass the Legislature.

A filibuster is possible, and likely if Dubya were to appoint him, but then will the filibuster rule be overturned? It's likely.



Edited By Sir O on 1100056058

[Galt]

Ashcroft won't get nominated. He's too hated, the democrats would filibuster and the public would probably be behind them. I bet there wouldn't be 5 democrats that would vote to stop the fillibuster.

Clarence Thomas is going to be the Chief Justice, Condi will possibly be Sec of State, and some other negro will be the AG.

Aside from the president, possibly the three most powerful people in the country will all be black. Rick James' birthday will be a national holiday.

[Sir O]

Condi as Secretary of State?

What makes you think that?

[GonzoStyle]

The big buzz before was that condi was front runner for powells job once he resigns.

[Sir O]

Seriously, no. Even Dubya wouldn't be that stupid.

[Galt]

Why not? She's well respected within the administration, she speaks like 4 languages, she's got a brilliant pedigree, and a guy I know who works on her security detail thinks the world of her (not that he has any power...but still)

If this is regarding "OMG!!! 9/11 happened on her watch and she let Al Queda run rampant and unchecked in the less than 9 months she was in office"...come on, seriously?

[Sir O]

Brilliant pedigree? Know what her area of expertise is? Soviet studies! The Soviet Union is dead!

And being well-respected within the administration--well, so was Ahmed Chalabi.

But above all, Sec. of State needs to be a Diplomat, that's what the State Dept. is. The diplomatic arm of a pretty damn undiplomatic government. Powell is a diplomat, and he did his best, I'll say above and beyond the call of duty.

Condi Rice isn't a diplomat. If she heads the State Dept....seriously, do you think anyone will see her as a Diplomat?

[Galt]

well, broadly Eastern European, but yes, she isn't a Mideast expert. But who is? Unless he goes and nominates Richard Clarke I don't think there are many people (on either side) who have a lot of diplomatic experience in that region, which is much of the reason why we are where we are.

I'm just thinking she's likely to be named because she has at least some experience whereas I don't think that there are many others that do in the area.

[Galt]

and Powell was a diplomat? is there anything LESS diplomatic than the army? It's his job to kill people and break things.

[Sir O]

That's what I don't understand...she has experience with other countries, but not with other countries who are our focus...but she's our pick because at least she has experience with other countries?

In the international relations department, that's like appointing Johnny Damon as head quarterback, because he has experience with sports, and even though he plays baseball, it's at least a sport and so is football.

And I don't really know who a good Sec. of State would be...probably Anthony Zinni, but that's not happening. But Rice WOULD BE DISASTER...holy fuck would it.

[Galt]

and being a diplomat in one region is wildly differnet than being a diplomat in another? I don't think so. I don't know why you think she'd be such a disaster. So what if she has eastern eurpean experience. Powell had no diplomatic experience. Zero. His expertise was in killing people and blowing shit up. most recently in the middle east, so I think the people there would be a little more cautious about him than they would about her.

She'd obviously be better suited for Rumsfeld's job if he leaves, though I doubt he will.

[Arpikarhu]

lets hope rumsfeld is next

[Sir O]

Powell had an understanding of the Middle East....god this is where I would need to go through multiple sources to prove my point...Powell went to war against an opponent under a president that at least made sure his generals UNDERSTOOD THE OPPONENT (under Dubya's Daddy, Gens. Powell and Schwarzkopf knew who they were facing). Dubya's daddy knew why we shouldn't take Baghdad, why fucking taking over Iraq would be stupid:

The end of effective Iraqi resistance came with a rapidity which surprised us all, and we were perhaps psychologically unprepared for the sudden transition from fighting to peacemaking. True to the guidelines we had established, when we had achieved our strategic objectives (ejecting Iraqi forces from Kuwait and eroding Saddam's threat to the region) we stopped the fighting. But the necessary limitations placed on our objectives, the fog of war, and the lack of "battleship Missouri" surrender unfortunately left unresolved problems, and new ones arose.

We were disappointed that Saddam's defeat did not break his hold on power, as many of our Arab allies had predicted and we had come to expect. President Bush repeatedly declared that the fate of Saddam Hussein was up to the Iraqi people. Occasionally, he indicated that removal of Saddam would be welcome, but for very practical reasons there was never a promise to aid an uprising. While we hoped that popular revolt or coup would topple Saddam, neither the U.S. nor the countries of the region wished to see the breakup of the Iraqi state. We were concerned about the long-term balance of power at the head of the Gulf. Trying to eliminate Saddam, extending the ground war into an occupation of Iraq, would have violated our guideline about not changing objectives in midstream, engaging in "mission creep," and would have incurred incalculable human and political costs. Apprehending him was probably impossible. We had been unable to find Noriega in Panama, which we knew intimately. We would have been forced to occupy Baghdad and, in effect, rule Iraq. The coalition would instantly have collapsed, the Arabs deserting it in anger and other allies pulling out as well. Under those circumstances, furthermore, we had been self-consciously trying to set a pattern for handling aggression in the post-cold war world. Going in and occupying Iraq, thus unilaterally exceeding the U.N.'s mandate, would have destroyed the precedent of international response to aggression we hoped to establish. Had we gone the invasion route, the U.S. could conceivably still be an occupying power in a bitterly hostile land. It would have been a dramatically different--and perhaps barren--outcome.

We discussed at length forcing Saddam himself to accept the terms of Iraqi defeat at Safwan--just north of the Kuwait-Iraq border--and thus the responsibility and political consequences for the humiliation of such a devastating defeat. In the end, we asked ourselves what we would do if he refused. We concluded that we would be left with two options: continue the conflict until he backed down, or retreat from our demands. The latter would have sent a disastrous signal. The former would have split our Arab colleagues from the coalition and, de facto, forced us to change our objectives. Given those unpalatable choices, we allowed Saddam to avoid personal surrender and permitted him to send one of his generals. Perhaps we could have devised a system of selected punishment, such as air strikes on different military units, which would have proved a viable third option, but we had fulfilled our well-defined mission; Safwan was waiting.

As the conflict wound down, we felt a sense of urgency on the part of the coalition Arabs to get it over with and return to normal. This meant quickly withdrawing U.S. forces to an absolute minimum. Earlier there had been some concern in Arab ranks that once they allowed U.S. forces into the Middle East, we would be there to stay. Saddam's propaganda machine fanned these worries. Our prompt withdrawal helped cement our position with our Arab allies, who now trusted us far more than they ever had. We had come to their assistance in their time of need, asked nothing for ourselves, and left again when the job was done. Despite some criticism of our conduct of the war, the Israelis too had their faith in us solidified. We had shown our ability--and willingness--to intervene in the Middle East in a decisive way when our interests were challenged. We had also crippled the military capability of one of their most bitter enemies in the region. Our new credibility (coupled with Yasser Arafat's need to redeem his image after backing the wrong side in the war) had a quick and substantial payoff in the form of a Middle East peace conference in Madrid.

The Gulf War had far greater significance to the emerging post-cold war world than simply reversing Iraqi aggression and restoring Kuwait. Its magnitude and significance impelled us from the outset to extend our strategic vision beyond the crisis to the kind of precedent we should lay down for the future. From an American foreign-policymaking perspective, we sought to respond in a manner which would win broad domestic support and which could be applied universally to other crises. In international terms, we tried to establish a model for the use of force. First and foremost was the principle that aggression cannot pay. If we dealt properly with Iraq, that should go a long way toward dissuading future would-be aggressors. We also believed that the U.S. should not go it alone, that a multilateral approach was better. This was, in part, a practical matter. Mounting an effective military counter to Iraq's invasion required the backing and bases of Saudi Arabia and other Arab states.

Google that: I don't think I need to cite my source there.